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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the trial court erred in determining exhaustion of
administrative remedies was not necessary when the plain language of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") requires exhaustion,
\when the purposes and intentions of Congress are furthered by exhaustion
ind when the limited exceptions do not apply?
2. Whether the trial court erred by prohibiting the Petitioners from
renewing their motion for judgment as a matter of law, after the jury
verdict, when liberal construction applied and the court indicated it need
not be renewed?
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OPINION BELOW
The opinion and judgment of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbus denying the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and the Defendant's Motion for Judgment as
a Matter of Law is unreported, but in the Record on Appeal. (R. 1-15, 130).
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Statement of Jurisdiction is omitted in accordance with the Rules
for the Northern Illinois University 2004 Prize Moot Court Competition.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Columbus
rendered on December 1, 2003, denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
and a judgment of the District Court of Columbus rendered on December
11, 2003, denying Defendant's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter
of Law.
Respondent brought this action alleging she was denied a free and
appropriate education as guaranteed by the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)
(2000), and was granted a verdict in her favor and awarded $435,000 for
lost educational opportunities and emotional distress.
The School District filed a timely motion to appeal and on January 9,
2004, this Court granted Petitioner's Leave to Appeal on two distinct
questions of law: 1. Whether a plaintiff seeking monetary damages under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) for violations of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act must first exhaust administrative processes. 2. Whether a
defendant's failure to renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the
close of all of the evidence bars a post-verdict motion for renewed
judgment as a matter of law.
The Petitioner respectfully requests that this Honorable Court reverse
the decision of the district court on both issues.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. SUMMARY OF THE FACTS
Plaintiff, Lori Busch (Plaintiff), was diagnosed with Tourette's
Syndrome and emotional problems on August 22, 1998. (R. 1-2). Plaintiff
attended Washington High School in Clarktown, Columbus, from August
2000 to May 2002. (R. 1-3). At that time, Jeb Hart was, and still is, the
principal of Washington High School, which is part of the Clark County
Independent School District (School District). (R. 1-2).
In August 2000, Carol M. Brown was the Director of Program
Development for the School District and was responsible for ensuring
students with disabilities were treated in compliance with the requirements
of state and federal law. (R. 1-2). The School District found that the
Plaintiff qualified for special education. (R. 1-3). The School District
developed an individualized education program (IEP) for the Plaintiff,
utilizing multidisciplinary evaluations, including contributions from a
variety of specialists. The School District designed the IEP to meet the
Plaintiff's unique needs. (R. 1-3). The School District outlined goals and
objectives for the Plaintiff's education. (R. 1-3). The IEP provided the
Plaintiff attend a single class for the entire day consisting exclusively of
special education students. The IEP also provided the Plaintiff be given
intensive, one-on-one tutoring. (R. 1-3).
In August 2000, the School District promptly implemented the IEP.
(R. 1-3). This action was taken in accordance with the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The School District also provided the
Plaintiff's parents with copies of the IDEA's procedural safeguards,
pursuant to law. (R. 1-3).
In accordance with the IEP, the School District put the Plaintiff in a
class taught for the entire day by Howard Edwards, a certified teacher. (R.
1-4). The School District facilitated one-on-one tutoring for the Plaintiff
through Washington High School's Senior Buddy Program. (R. 1-20-21).
This program specified that one freshman meet with his or her senior
buddy in the morning each school day in the courtyard. (R. 1-4, 1-21).
Many other students met in the courtyard in the morning for various
activities as well. (R. 1-2 1).
The Plaintiff testified that the tutoring sessions were spent reviewing
material she learned in class. (R. 1-17). A peer tutor really helped her in
Geometry. (R. 1-17-18). The classroom windows allotted a view of the
courtyard. (R. 1-18). This bothered her. Other students teased her at lunch
and took note of the fact that she was not learning with the rest of her class.
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(R. 1-18). She repeatedly asked Mr. Edwards to discontinue the tutoring,
but he did not. (R. 1-4).
The Respondent graduated from Washington High School with her
class in May 2002. She was nineteen years old at the time she filed suit.
(R. 1-3).
B. SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On November 1, 2003, the Plaintiff filed suit against the School
District in the United States District Court for the District of Columbus.
(R. 1-5). She requested recovery of monetary damages to pay for
counseling and tutoring and monetary damages under § 1983. (R. 1-5).
Defendants School District, Carol M. Brown, Jeb Hart, and Howard
Edwards (Defendants), filed Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction on November 14, 2003. (R. 1-6-9). First, the
Defendants argued the IDEA mandates exhaustion of administrative
procedures before a civil action can be filed. (R. 1-6). Second, the
Defendants argued that allowing litigants to avoid the administrative
processes would contradict Congress' intent in enacting the IDEA. (R. 17). Despite noting that it was following the plain language of 20 U.S.C. §
1415, the court nonetheless found the Plaintiff did not need to exhaust
administrative processes before filing a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
monetary damages and denied the motion. (R. 1-13-16).
The case proceeded to trial on December 9-10, 2003, before the
Honorable Coleman Powell. (R. 1-17). Upon the Plaintiff resting her case,
the Defendants made a motion for judgment as a matter of law. (R. 1-20).
In response, the judge stated that he was "going to deny this motion for
now", but that "[w]e may want to re-visit this motion after you rest your
case." (R. 1-20). The School District then briefly called a single witness
and rested its case. (R. 1-20-21). The jury deliberated, found in favor of
the Plaintiff, and awarded her monetary damages of $435,000. (R. 1-22).
The Defendants renewed their motion for judgment as a matter of law. The
Plaintiff objected. (R. 1-22).
A hearing was held on December 11, 2003, to determine whether the
Defendants would be permitted to renew their motion for judgment as a
matter of law. (R. 1-30). First, the Defendants argued that strict adherence
to the language of Rule 50(b) is contrary to the principle of liberal
construction. (R. 1-24-25). Second, the Defendants argued that the court's
indication that the motion need not be renewed at the close of evidence
reserves their right to a renewed motion after the jury verdict. (R. 1-25).
The court found that the Defendants would not be permitted to renew their
motion for judgment as a matter of law. (R. 1-30).
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On January 9, 2004, this Honorable Court granted Defendants' appeal
to determine whether the United States District Court for the District of
Columbus erred on two issues. (R. 1-32). The first issue is whether the
Plaintiff, seeking monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations
of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, must first exhaust
administrative processes. The second issue is whether the Defendants'
failure to renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all
of the evidence bars a post-verdict motion for renewed judgment as a
matter of law. (R. 1-32).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Respondent did not exhaust the administrative procedures as
required under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and
therefore the decision of the district court denying the motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be reversed on this matter.
Furthermore, the district court failed to permit the Petitioners to make a
post-verdict motion for renewed judgment as a matter of law, in accordance
with liberal construction and the majority of circuits, thus the district
court's decision on this matter should be reversed.
When Congress created the IDEA it included specific procedures
aggrieved parties should follow, including the right to a due process
hearing before an impartial hearing officer and an appeal provision, neither
of which the Respondent requested. Congress also expressly stated in the
IDEA that parties may not bypass these procedures by bringing the claim
pursuant to another law without first exhausting the procedures under the
IDEA. The Respondent's claim was a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for
monetary damages for violations of the IDEA. The Respondent never
attempted to pursue this claim under the IDEA, even though she was
required to exhaust all of the administrative procedures before seeking
judicial review. The plain language of the statute states that before filing a
civil action under another law seeking relief that is also available under the
IDEA, the procedures provided for by the IDEA shall be exhausted. The
term "relief available" means relief for the type of injury or the nature of
the claim.
It does not mean whatever relief the party requests.
Additionally, the legislative history indicates that Congress supports this
interpretation of the exhaustion requirement.
Congress' primary goal in enacting the IDEA was to ensure that all
disabled students receive a free appropriate education. By allowing the
Respondent to bypass the provisions of the IDEA, the district court
frustrated this purpose. The Respondent should have requested a due
process hearing so that the agency vested with the requisite expertise could
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develop a factual record for judicial review. Instead, the court excused the
Respondent from this exhaustion requirement, substituting its own notion
of sound educational policy for that of the administrative agency. When
the Respondent decided to wait until after graduation to address her
grievance, the educational deficiency was allowed to continue for two
years, and this is contrary to Congress' intent of providing every disabled
child with an appropriate education.
Congress carved out limited exceptions to the exhaustion rule. The
Respondent's case does not fall under any of these exceptions. She did not
prove that it would be futile to pursue administrative remedies, nor did she
prove that there is no relief available to her under the administrative
scheme. Finally, the last exemption is for injuries that are purely based in
law. The Respondent does not qualify for this exemption because her
injury is fact specific, the exact type of injury that the IDEA was designed
to redress.
The principle of liberal construction should be applied to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 50(b). The scope and purpose of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure require they be applied liberally to effect just and efficient
results. The advisory committee notes to Rule 50(b) suggest a relaxation of
the language of the rule, because the 1963 phrase "close of all the
evidence" was changed to "close of the evidence" in 1991. Removal of the
word "all" from the notes evidences the advisory committee's loosening of
the timing requirement and their support of a more liberal standard. As
applied to the facts of the instant case, liberal construction is appropriate. It
satisfies recognized safeguards that ensure its proper use.
The majority of circuits have applied liberal construction to Rule
50(b). These circuits have emphasized applying the rule according to its
purpose over strictly adhering to its language. These circuits have focused
on how best to achieve justice. They have placed the spirit of the rule
above the creation of an inflexible trial scenario and have struck a balance
between the two.
The court should have permitted the Petitioners to renew their motion
for judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL") after the jury verdict. The
majority of circuits are split between using two different two-prong tests to
determine whether the right to renew a motion was reserved. These tests
share the same first prong, which asks whether the district court indicated
the prior motion need not be renewed. The second prong of the first test
evaluates whether the evidence introduced after the initial motion was
brief. The second prong of the second test determines whether the
opposing party reasonably understood the court's indication meant the
motion was still alive and that they were free to put on additional evidence.
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All three prongs are satisfied by the facts of this case so the Petitioners
would prevail, no matter which test the court chooses to apply.
Because the district court erred on both of the issues presented, the
decision should be reversed.

2004]

BEST PETITIONER'S BRIEF

ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES WAS NOT
REQUIRED PRIOR TO SEEKING JUDICIAL REVIEW BECAUSE THE
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE IDEA EXPRESSLY REQUIRES
EXHAUSTION
BECAUSE
ADDITIONALLY,
EXHAUSTION;
PROMOTES CONGRESS' PURPOSE BEHIND ENACTING THE IDEA,
AND BECAUSE NONE OF THE LIMITED EXCEPTIONS TO THE
EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT APPLY.
The district court erred when it denied the Petitioner's Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, thus allowing the
Respondent to bypass the required exhaustion of administrative remedies.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1) (2000). The plain language of the IDEA requires
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Id. This requirement furthers the
purpose of the IDEA, and, while the language is not to be applied rigidly,
none of the exceptions Congress carved out of the exhaustion requirement
are appropriate in this case. See Rose v. Yeaw, 214 F.3d 206 (1st Cir.
2000).
First, the district court misinterpreted the plain meaning of the IDEA,
which requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before seeking relief
under §1983 and, the legislative history supports the plain language
requiring exhaustion. See Doe v. Alfred, 906 F. Supp. 1092 (S.D.W.Va.
1995). Second, not requiring exhaustion of the administrative remedies
frustrated Congress' purpose for enacting the IDEA, which was to provide
a free appropriate public education to disabled students, because the agency
possesses the required educational expertise and because it is in the interest
of justice for courts, as generalists, to review an agency-created factual
record. See McKart v.United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-95 (1969). Finally,
the Respondent was not entitled to an exemption of the exhaustion
requirement under the IDEA because she did not prove the administrative
process would have been futile, or that it was improbable she would receive
adequate relief under the IDEA, and because her injury was one of fact
rather than of law. See Christopher W. v. Portsmouth Sch. Comm., 877
F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1989).
"Whether exhaustion is required under the IDEA in a particular case is
a question of law" that the Court of Appeals reviews de novo. Doe v. Ariz.
Dep't of Educ., 111 F.3d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1997).
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A. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
EXHAUSTION WAS NOT NECESSARY BECAUSE THE PLAIN
MEANING OF THE IDEA REQUIRES EXHAUSTION, AND
BECAUSE THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY SUPPORTS THE PLAIN
LANGUAGE OF THE IDEA'S EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT.
Because the Respondent failed to exhaust the administrative remedies
available to her under the IDEA, the district court erred in denying the
Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. See Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1 in the City
and County of Denver, Colo., 233 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2000). The plain
meaning of the IDEA expressly requires exhaustion prior to seeking
judicial review. Doe, 906 F. Supp. at 1100. Further, the legislative history
indicates that exhaustion is required under the plain meaning of the IDEA.
Id. at 1099.
1. The district court erred in allowing the respondent to bypass the
exhaustion requirement because the plain meaning of the IDEA expressly
requires exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial
review.
The Respondent's injuries were educational in nature, the specific
type the IDEA's administrative procedures and remedies were designed to
redress, therefore exhaustion of these remedies was required under the
plain meaning of the IDEA, despite the Respondent's request for damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Padilla, 233 F.3d 1268. The IDEA's
exhaustion requirements provide for an administrative due process hearing
and appeal, respectively. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(f)-1415(h). Any party
aggrieved by the findings has the right to bring a civil action, but only after
an appeal has been made under subsection (g) or after a due process
hearing from which the party does not have the right to appeal. 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(2). An aggrieved party must follow the exhaustion provision of
the IDEA even when the suit is brought pursuant to another statute.
Padilla, 233 F.3d. at 1274. This provision states,
Nothing in [the IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or
limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under
the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 .... title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . .. ,or
other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with
disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action
under such laws seeking relief that is also available under
[the IDEA], the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) of
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this section shall be exhausted to the same extent as would
be required had the action been brought under this
subchapter.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(1) (emphasis added).
Congress mandates exhaustion regardless of the particular relief
requested through a given set of administrative procedures. Booth v.
Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). In Booth, the Supreme Court
explained that the word exhaustion has a decidedly procedural emphasis
and "that one 'exhausts' processes, not forms of relief' which they request.
Id. at 739. Given the language of the statute and the Supreme Court's
holding in Booth, the statutory requirement "means that a party must
exhaust all available avenues of administrative review regardless of
whether the administrative process offers the particular type of relief that is
being sought." Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 62 (1st Cir.
2002).
Likewise, a number of courts have held that the term "relief available"
means "relief for the events, condition, or consequences of which the
person complains, not necessarily relief of the kind the person prefers."
Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ. of Skokie Sch. Dist., 98 F.3d 989, 992 (7th Cir.
1996); see also Frazier, 276 F.3d at 63; Padilla, 233 F.3d at 1274; N.B.
Alachua County Sch. Bd., 84 F.3d 1376, 1379 (1 lth Cir. 1996); Doe, 906
F. Supp. at 1098-99; Marlana G. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, Douglas
County, Kan., 167 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1307 (D. Kan. 2001).
Because it is the nature of the claim and the governing law which
govern the "relief available" as expressed in the IDEA, rather than the
relief sought, and because the district court's decision denying the Motion
to Dismiss was based on a misinterpretation of the plain meaning of the
IDEA, the district court's decision should be reversed.
Despite the Respondent's claim that the relief she sought is
unavailable under the IDEA's statutory scheme, it is "[t]he nature of the
claim and the governing law [which] determine the relief no matter what
the plaintiff demands." See Charlie F., 98 F.3d at 992.
In Charlie F., the plaintiff was a disabled student who was teased by
the other children in the class about his disability, at the teacher's
invitation. This led to a loss of self-esteem, humiliation and disruption of
his education. Id. at 990. The disabled student's parents did not seek
administrative remedies, but rather moved him to a different school. Id.
They later filed suit seeking damages under §1983 for misconceived
educational strategies that injure disabled students. Id. at 991. The district
court reasoned that matters related to the provision of a free appropriate
public education were provided for under the IDEA. Id.; see also 20
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U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E). The Court of Appeals held that because relief was
available, at least in principle, under the IDEA, the student was required to
use the IDEA's administrative processes prior to seeking judicial review,
despite his request for money damages under § 1983. Id. at 993.
The present case is similar to Charlie F. in that both claimed injuries
relating to the provision of a free appropriate public education. In the
present case, the Respondent claimed that she was denied educational
opportunities because of the peer-tutoring program. (R. 1-4). This is
similar to the complaint of misconceived educational strategies in Charlie
F., because both activities were educational in nature and had the effect of
causing both students to feel embarrassed and humiliated. (R. 1-18). This
is significant because the court held that the IDEA expressly provides a
remedial scheme for injuries relating to a student's education. Charlie F.,
98 F.3d at 993. Like Charlie F., the Respondent did not even attempt to
address her concerns in the administrative scheme, and, like Charlie F., she
requested monetary relief under § 1983. The court found it insignificant in
Charlie F. that monetary damages were unavailable under the IDEA,
reiterating the fact that relief available refers to the nature of the claim
rather than relief requested. Id. at 992.
The trial court misinterpreted the plain language of the IDEA,
specifically the term, "relief available," as meaning relief requested. (R. 114). This misinterpretation was derived from a portion of a Third Circuit
holding which stated that the plain language requires exhaustion only
before the filing of a civil action seeking relief "'also available"' under the
IDEA. W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 496 (3d Cir. 1995). In Matula, the
court determined that damages were not available under the IDEA;
therefore, the plaintiff's damages action was not subject to the exhaustion
requirement. Id. at 496. The district court in the present case stopped its
reading of the holding here, short of the entirety of Matula's analysis.
There were two other considerations central to the court's holding.
First, the plaintiff in that case had participated in an extended series of
administrative proceedings, including four due process hearings, which
resulted in the development of an extensive factual record. Id. at 496. The
court noted that in circumstances lacking this process, exhaustion might
still be required. Id. Second, the parties had resolved all issues other than
the damage issue and nothing could have been awarded through another
due process hearing. Id. These two elements of the Matula holding
distinguish it from the present case. A significant distinction is the fact that
there have been no administrative proceedings at all in the present case and
the parties have not resolved any of the issues complained of by the
Respondent. The Matula court specifically held that in this type of case
exhaustion may still be necessary.
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Further, it is not the case, as in Matula, that the Respondent sought
only money damages. In the present case, in addition to her money
damages claim, the Respondent sought damages to specifically pay for
counseling and tutoring, which are forms of relief available under the
IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (a)(17) (describing related services which are
available, including counseling and tutoring). Despite the fact that the
Respondent has sought separate remedies, in which one is available under
the IDEA and one is not, courts will not separate the claims and apply a
remedy-by-remedy analysis. See Falzett v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist.,
150 F. Supp. 2d 699, 705 (M.D. Pa. 2001). This would result in courts
resolving disputes in a piecemeal fashion and creating increased judicial
inefficiency. Id. Furthermore, the plain language of § 1415(1) states that
exhaustion of administrative procedures is required. Id. "[T]he statute
does not say that each remedy sought must be exhausted before that remedy
is pursued in court, but that IDEA administrative procedures must be
exhausted before a civil action is filed....

This language precludes any

interpretation of [Matula] and § 1415(1) under which exhaustion is judged
with respect to each individual remedy sought by the plaintiff." Id. Accord
Booth, 532 U.S. at 739.
There is no adequate interpretation of the plain language of the IDEA
which would allow the Respondent to bypass the administrative remedies
available to her; therefore, the district court erred when denying the
Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss and the decision should be reversed.
2. The legislative history behind the enactment of the IDEA supports
the plain meaning of the IDEA requiring the exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
The legislative history behind 20 U.S.C. § 1415 supports the plain
meaning of the IDEA requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies prior
to seeking judicial review. See Doe, 906 F. Supp. at 1099. Legislative
history is a common method courts use in determining legislative intent,
and, thereby the meaning of a statute. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,
Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995) (using legislative history to interpret a
statute). But see Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Central Sch. Dist.,
Westchester County v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 204 n.26 (1982) (rejecting a
legislative history argument because it was "too thin a reed on which to
base an interpretation"). Ultimately it is the "language of a statute [which]
constitutes the preeminent indicator of legislative intent." Frazier, 276 F.3d
at 68.
Because the district court mistakenly relied on a single comment to
determine legislative history, and because an examination of the legislative
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history reveals that the legislative intent was ultimately drafted into the
statute, the legislative history supports the plain meaning of the exhaustion
requirement.
The district court mistakenly relied on the following comment to
clarify the plain meaning of the IDEA, "administrative remedies would...
be excused where... resort to those proceedings would be futile." S. Rep.
No. 99 - 112, at 14 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798, 1805.
This was in error because it is only one comment, and, when put into
context with the rest of the text, it does nothing to clarify when something
is futile. Consequently, it is necessary to analyze the legislative history
further to determine the legislative intent.
The Senate Report, which culminated in the passage of § 1415(f),
states: "Congress' original intent was that due process procedures,
including the right to litigation if that became necessary, be available to all
parents." Doe, 906 F. Supp. at 1099 (quoting S. Rep. No. 99-112, at 2
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798, 1799). The Report further
provides as follows:
[§ 1415(f)] provides that the [IDEA] does not limit the
applicability of other laws which protect handicapped
children and youth, except that when a parent brings suit
under another law when that suit could have been brought
under the [IDEA], the parent will be required to exhaust
[IDEA] administrative remedies to the same degree as
would have been required had the suit been brought under
the [IDEA].
S. Rep. No. 99-112, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798,
1800. The Report goes on to say:
[Further even though § 1415(f) of the bill] does not affect
the applicability of other Federal laws related to special
education, it also makes clear that nothing is [sic] [the
provision] should be interpreted to allow parents to
circumvent the due process procedures and protections
created under the [IDEA]. For example, under the [IDEA]
parents must generally exhaust administrative remedies to
attempt to resolve certain disagreements before filing ...
suit under another law that protects the rights of
handicapped children. . . ,if that suit could have been filed
under the [IDEA], then parents are required to exhaust
[IDEA] administrative remedies to the same extent as
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would have been necessary if the suit had been filed under
the [IDEA].
S. Rep. No. 99-112, at 14 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798,
1805.
This indicates the legislative intent that exhaustion is required under
the plain meaning of the IDEA whenever a claim is brought, without regard
to the statute the plaintiff chooses to file under and according to the type of
claim rather than the type of relief requested. Furthermore, the Senate
Report culminated in § 1415(f), and it is ultimately the language of the
statute that indicates legislative intent.
B. THE DISTRICT COURT FRUSTRATED THE PURPOSE OF
CONGRESS WHEN IT ALLOWED THE RESPONDENT TO BYPASS
THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT OF THE IDEA BECAUSE IT
DENIED THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY THE OPPORTUNITY TO
CORRECT ITS OWN MISTAKES BY APPLYING ITS EDUCATIONAL
EXPERTISE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FACTUAL RECORD.
The district court's decision allowing the plaintiff to bypass
administrative proceedings is in tension with the purpose of the IDEA
because it allowed the parents of a disabled student with an allegation of
educational substance to circumvent the agency procedures, an action that
Congress specifically intended to prevent. See generally Carey v. Me. Sch.
Admin. Dist. #17, 754 F. Supp. 906 (D. Me. 1990) (noting that
knowledgeable educational experts should be the "first in the line of
review" to evaluate the adequacy of the educational services).
"Congress intended to limit the scope of civil suits brought pursuant to
Section 1415(e) to challenges of final decisions of state administrative
agencies." Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 158 (2d Cir. 1992). This
furthers its primary goal of ensuring that children with disabling conditions
are accorded a free appropriate education because the exhaustion allows for
the exercise of discretion and educational expertise by state and local
agencies, affords full exploration of technical educational issues, furthers
development of a complete factual record and promotes judicial efficiency
by giving these agencies the first opportunity to fix their own mistakes and
prevents courts from undermining the administrative process. McKart, 395
U.S. at 193-95. Finally, federal courts are "generalists with no experience
in the educational needs of handicapped students" and should be given "the
benefit of expert factfinding by a state agency devoted to this very
purpose." Crocker v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 873 F.2d 933,
935 (6th Cir. 1989).
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The district court's denial of the Motion to Dismiss in the present case
was faulty because it denied the agency an opportunity to correct its own
errors by applying its educational expertise; it allowed the Respondent to
sit on the claim, not addressing the educational issues when they occurred,
which is directly at odds with the purpose of the IDEA; and, it denied the
agency the opportunity to develop a factual record.
By allowing the Respondent to bypass the exhaustion requirements,
the district court substituted its own notion of sound educational policy for
that of the administrative agency who actually possessed the requisite level
of expertise. See generally Rowley, 458 U.S. 176. While the facts in
Rowley are not particularly analogous to the present case, the logic and
reasoning of the Supreme Court are important in this analysis. The Court
noted that the "primary responsibility for formulating the education [of] a
handicapped child, and for choosing the educational method most suitable
to the child's needs, was left by [Congress] to state and local educational
agencies." Id. at 207. The Court further "cautioned that courts lack the
'specialized knowledge and experience' necessary to resolve 'questions of
educational policy."' Id. at 208. The district court in the present case
decided that the Respondent could bypass the statutory requirements by
simply requesting a damage remedy under §1983, based on an IDEA
violation, and this is expressly disallowed.
Based on Rowley, the
Respondent should have consulted the administrative agency with her
grievances because it possessed the knowledge and expertise best suited to
address her needs. Instead she chose to bypass the experts and the district
court mistakenly sanctioned this choice by denying the Motion to Dismiss.
Furthermore, the Respondent should not have been allowed to
circumvent the administrative scheme by waiting to pursue a claim until
after she graduated. See Frazier, 276 F.3d at 63. In Frazier, the court held
that even after graduation, "plaintiffs who bring an IDEA-based claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which they seek only money damages, must
[still] exhaust the administrative process available under the IDEA as a
condition precedent to entering a state or federal court." Id. at 64. In
Frazier, a student who had already graduated from high school asserted a
§ 1983 claim based on a violation of the IDEA. Id. at 63. She did not
attempt to follow the administrative scheme; instead, she argued that
because she had already graduated, "the administrative process could do
nothing to ameliorate the bungling that marred her educational experience."
Id. The court disagreed.
It reasoned that even after graduation,
compensatory education is an available remedy. Id. It also reasoned that
"the entire matter of timing is largely within a plaintiff's control" and that
permitting plaintiffs to proceed without first exhausting administrative
remedies might simply encourage them to wait until after graduation
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precisely in the hope of recovering money damages. Id. at 63. This means
that plaintiffs would not be required to address educational issues when
they arise and this would be "directly at odds with the IDEA's primary goal
of ensuring the education of children with disabilities." Id.
The present case is quite similar to Frazier. Both involve students
who did not pursue the required administrative remedies. Both were
students who had graduated prior to filing their § 1983 claim and both were
entirely in control of the timing of their cases. For instance, the
Respondent claimed she was uncomfortable with the situation for two
years, yet she never filed a complaint or requested a due process hearing.
(R. 1-4). Her parents were given the procedural remedies available to her
yet they chose to do nothing at all (R. 1-3). This is important because it is
completely at odds with Congress' purpose behind the IDEA, to provide a
free and appropriate education to disabled students, and the court in Frazier
held that this type of circumvention is not acceptable. Frazier, 276 F. 3d at
64.
Furthermore, the Respondent, like Frazier, was entitled to
administrative relief at the time of the occurrence. In fact, she remains
entitled to administrative relief under the IDEA in the form of
compensatory education and related services. The Respondent, like
Frazier, should not be allowed. to have simply waited until money damages
were available rather than pursue an available remedy for the educationalbased harm when itoccurred.
Allowing this is an invitation to future
litigants to just wait and then collect damages under §1983. This does not
promote the goal of ensuring education for the disabled, rather it promotes
ongoing educational deficiencies by not stopping them when they occur.
Finally, by failing to exhaust the available administrative remedies,
the Respondent denied the district court the use of a fully-developed
record, which they were entitled to under the IDEA. Id. at 60. In Frazier,
the court held that "[eixhaustion is beneficial regardless of whether the
administrative process offers the specific form of remediation sought by a
particular plaintiff."
Id. at 61.
The court further noted that the
"administrative process facilitates the compilation of a fully developed
record by a factfinder versed in the educational needs of disabled children and that record is an invaluable resource for a state or federal court." Id.
At the very least, the administrative process should have been pursued in
this case in order to develop a factual record for the court, which should be
given the benefit of expert fact-finding by the agency devoted to that very
purpose. See Crocker, 873 F. 2d at 935.
C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT
EXHAUSTION WAS NOT REQUIRED BECAUSE OF THE FUTILITY
EXCEPTION WHEN THE RESPONDENT DID NOT PROVE THE
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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS WOULD BE FUTILE, WHEN SHE
STILL HAD REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO HER UNDER THE IDEA,
AND WHEN THE ISSUE IS ONE OF FACT, RATHER THAN LAW.
Because the Respondent's injuries do not fall under the narrow
exceptions the IDEA has outlined, she was required to exhaust
administrative remedies. See Rose, 214 F.3d 206. Congress provided three
limited situations where exhaustion of the administrative remedies under
the IDEA are not required: 1)where "it would be futile to use the due
process procedures"; 2) where "it is improbable that adequate relief can be
obtained by pursuing administrative remedies"; and, 3) where "an agency
has adopted a policy or pursued a practice of general applicability that is
contrary to the law." Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 756 (2d Cir.
1987). Finally, parents bear the burden of proving the futility exception
applies to their circumstances. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327 (1988).
The Respondent should not have been excused from pursuing
administrative remedies by any of the exceptions to exhaustion. She did
not prove it would have been futile to pursue administrative remedies
because there was available relief under the IDEA and her injury is not
contrary to the law, rather it is fact specific.
The fact that the Respondent is nineteen years old and has already
graduated from high school does not automatically render administrative
remedies futile. There are many other relevant factors to consider. See
Christopher W., 877 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that a disabled
nineteen year old boy who had not exhausted his administrative remedies
could not invoke the futility exception because he had not requested a due
process hearing); see also Polera v. Bd. of Educ. of the Newburgh Enlarged
City Sch. Dist., 288 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 2002). In Polera, the plaintiff was a
disabled student who had graduated from high school. 288 F.3d at 480.
She alleged that the school district "failed to provide her with [a] free
appropriate public education, including study materials, compensation for
tutoring, and recognition of academic achievements, to which she was
entitled as a disabled student." Id. The school district provided the
"mother with notice of the administrative remedies available to her for
deficiencies in her daughter's education." Id. She "never sought relief for
her grievances through the administrative process." Id.
The mother argued that the futility exception applied to her claims
because "it would have been pointless to seek administrative [review] from
the very entities that had failed to implement the clearly stated
requirements" of her Individual Education Plan (IEP) and that "the
administrative process could not provide the relief that she sought." Id.at
488. She relied on a statement made by Senator Paul Simon: "'It is
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important to note that there are certain situations in which it is not
appropriate to require exhaustion of [IDEA] administrative remedies before

filing a civil law suit. These include complaints that

. . .

an agency has

failed to provide services specified in the child's [IEP]."' Id. at 489; see
also H.R. Rep. No. 99-206, at 7 (1985) (exhaustion not required where "it
would be futile to use the due process procedures (e.g., an agency has
failed to provide services specified in the child's IEP)").
The court in Polera easily dismissed this argument, referring to it as
"broad language without qualification," holding that to accept the argument
would allow any IEP-related claim to be framed as one of
"'implementation"' and thereby allow plaintiffs to "sidestep the IDEA's
exhaustion requirement." 288 F.3d at 489. Essentially, "the futility
exception would swallow the exhaustion requirement." Id. The court
noted that "the administrative process is uniquely well suited to review the
content and implementation" of such IEPs and would have been
"particularly valuable" in her case because the IEP prepared for Polera was
vague at best, "offering little detail beyond a requirement that the school
district provide a 'curriculum' to Polera." Id. at 487. The IEP included a
long list of goals, such as "'will successfully accomplish the required
language arts skills necessary to complete the grade 12 curriculum."' Id. at
489. The court stated this was too vague because it was left to speculate as
to what type of materials or services were to be provided. Id. The court
also stated that the fact that Polera sought damages, which are not
"available relief' under the IDEA, "does not enable her to sidestep the
exhaustion requirements of the IDEA." Id. at 488. And, when a "remedy
is available at the time of injury, a disabled student claiming deficiencies in
his or her education may not ignore the administrative process, then later
sue for damages." Id.Based on this reasoning, the court held that Polera
was required to exhaust her administrative remedies. Id.
The present case presents very similar issues to those found in Polera.
Factually, they are similar because they are both dealing with an alleged
failure to provide a free, appropriate public education. Specifically, the
cases are similar because they both allege the school did not follow their
IEP. In the present case, the IEP is significantly more vague than the IEP
in Polera. For instance, Polera's contains goals, such as accomplishing the
required language arts skills. In this case the IEP merely states that the
Respondent was to attend a single class and that she should receive one-onone tutoring. (R. 1-3-4). It does not specify what kind of classes she was
to take, only that she would attend just one. It also does not state how the
tutoring would occur, who would provide the tutoring and where it would
take place. The Respondent alleges she was injured because she received
peer-tutoring sessions, which took place in the courtyard of the school.
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However, these activities were the school district's attempt to implement
her IEP. The terms of the IEP, like those in Polera, are too vague and are
cause for speculation. The court in Polera stated these are the type of
concerns the IDEA was designed to redress.
Other significant similarities are that both cases involve students who
were given the guidelines of their procedural remedies, and who did not
request due process hearings pursuant to the guidelines. The fact that the
Respondent in the present case told her teacher, Defendant Edwards, that
she did not like the peer-tutoring (R. 1-4) is irrelevant because she should
have requested a due process hearing before an impartial hearing officer.
In both cases the parents knew what they were required to do but chose not
to. Polera says this choice cannot be converted to money damages just
because that is what is being requested. Finally, both cases involve
students who had graduated from high school, and in both cases the injury
was wholly in the past. The court did not find this significant, but in fact
dismissed this because the timing was entirely in the hands of the parents.
Alternatively, in Covington v. Knox County School System, a mother
of a disabled student brought a §1983 claim against a school because the
student had been locked inside a small, dark, unheated, unventilated cell for
long periods of time as a disciplinary measure. 205 F.3d 912, 913 (6th Cir.
2000). The court held that in the "unique circumstances" of that case, in
which his injuries were wholly in the past, that money damages were the
only remedy that could make him whole. Id. at 917. The court stated that
proceeding through the administrative process would be futile. Id. While
there are similarities between Covington and the present case, specifically
that both students had graduated and both students complained of past,
rather than ongoing, conduct, the present case is distinguishable from
Covington because of the unique circumstances of Covington. Namely, the
injuries were of an extreme, abusive nature that could only have been
remedied monetarily, whether he pursued a claim at the time they occurred,
or now. Whereas in the present case the Respondent claims injuries that
are educational in nature, rather than abusive, as in Covington. She could
have, and still could, receive administrative relief, an example being
compensatory education, for the wrongs she claimed occurred. The court
in Polera distinguished Covington, despite very similar facts, on the same
grounds that Polera, similar to the Respondent in the present case, had a
fully effective remedy available to her at the time; she simply chose not to
pursue it. Polera, 288 F.3d at 490. The court was not persuaded by the
Covington decision and neither should this court be.
Finally, the Respondent was not entitled to exemption from
exhausting her administrative remedies based on the exception that states,
''an agency has adopted a policy or pursued a practice that is contrary to
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law," Tirozzi, 832 F.2d at 756, despite the fact that the school district in the
present case had adopted a policy which was endorsed by the principal and
teacher allowing for peer-tutoring. (R. 1-5). This is because the policy is
Issues consisting "primarily of questions of
educationally based.
substantive educational policy" are the type the "administrative process
was specifically designed to address" and are to be exhausted first in an
administrative hearing. Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F. 2d
1298, 1309 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that even where local school policies
appear on their face to violate the IDEA, administrative exhaustion is
necessary to give the state a reasonable opportunity to investigate and
correct such policies).
The fact that the policy was adopted and in effect for all disabled
students, rather than just the Respondent, is immaterial. It does not rise to
the level of systemic failures, which is required to invoke this exception.
The purpose for the exception is that often in these types of cases requiring
an exception from the exhaustion requirement, the challenged policies are
enforced by the highest administrative level, so that the only meaningful
remedy is through the courts. See Tirozzi, 832 F.2d at 752-53. The policy
in this case is very fact specific and is not related to the administrative
process or contrary to law. Rather, it focuses on only one factor of the
educational process and is enforced at the lowest level. A due process
hearing was designed to correct local policies such as these. Further, in
order to meet the complex service needs for handicapped children, there is
a need for flexibility and experimentation in educational programming.
Terry Jean Seligmann, A Diller, A Dollar: Section 1983 Damage Claims in
Special Education Lawsuits, 36 Ga. L. Rev. 465, 484 (2002). Because the
policy in the present case is purely educational, it should have been
addressed by the statutory scheme.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY PROHIBITING THE
PETITIONERS FROM MAKING THEIR POST-VERDICT MOTION
FOR RENEWED JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, BECAUSE
LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION SHOULD BE APPLIED AND THE
COURT INDICATED THE MOTION NEED NOT BE RENEWED.
The district court erred when it did not allow the Petitioners to make
their post-verdict motion for renewed judgment as a matter of law (JMOL).
See Taylor Publ'g Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2000).
During the trial, the Petitioners initially made a motion for JMOL at the
close of the Respondent's case. (R. 1-20). Making this motion reserved
the right to renew the motion after the verdict for two reasons. First, when
the principle of liberal construction is applied to Federal Rule of Civil
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Procedure 50(b), the right was reserved because the purpose of Rule 50(b)
and its interpretation supported by the majority of circuits was satisfied.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b); Laborers' Pension Fund v. A &
C Envtl., Inc., 301 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2002). Second, the right was
reserved because the court indicated that the motion did not need to be
renewed at the close of all the evidence; therefore, the tests, applied by the
majority of circuits to determine whether the right to renew a motion was
reserved, are satisfied. See Pahuta v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 170 F.3d 125
(2d Cir. 1999); Riverview Invs., Inc. v. Ottawa Cmty. Improvement Corp.,
899 F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1990).
Whether a motion for judgment as a matter of law should be denied in
a particular case is a question of law that the Court of Appeals reviews de
novo. Breidenbach v. Bolish, 126 F.3d 1288, 1291 (10th Cir. 1997).
A. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY STRICTLY ADHERING
TO THE LANGUAGE OF RULE 50(b) BECAUSE STRICT
ADHERENCE IS CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF LIBERAL
CONSTRUCTION REQUIRED BY THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE AND THE MAJORITY OF CIRCUITS.
The district court erred by applying strict construction to the language
of Rule 50(b), instead of applying liberal construction. The rule states,
If, for any reason, the court does not grant a motion for
judgment as a matter of law made at the close of all the
evidence, the court is considered to have submitted the
action to the jury subject to the court's later deciding the
legal questions raised by the motion. The movant may
renew its request for judgment as a matter of law by filing
a motion no later than 10 days after entry of judgment ....
Fed R. Civ. P. 50(b). Strict construction considers "only the literal words
of a writing" or "words narrowly," while liberal construction "applies a
writing in light of the situation presented" and "tends to effectuate the spirit
and purpose of the writing." Black's Law Dictionary 308 (7th ed. 1999).
Liberal construction best satisfies the scope and purpose of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure defined in Rule 1, which states that the rules are
to "be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Further, the
majority of circuits have prioritized satisfying the underlying purposes of
Rule 50 over strictly enforcing its terms. Rollin A. Ransom, Toward a
Liberal Application of the "Close of all the Evidence" Requirement of Rule
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50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Embracing Fairness Over
Formalism, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1060, 1061 (1993) (hereinafter Embracing
Fairness Over Formalism).
1. Liberal construction is required by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbus erred by
applying strict construction to the language of Rule 50(b), instead of
applying liberal construction as mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Liberal construction should be applied to
Rule 50(b) in the instant case because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
explicitly require it. See id. Further, it is proper to apply liberal
construction to Rule 50(b) instead of only considering its plain language
because the safeguards that prevent against the inappropriate use of liberal
construction are satisfied. See Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Coming to Terms
with Strict and Liberal Construction, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 9, 80 (2000).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure embrace a liberal spirit. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 1. Rule 1 instructs courts to apply the rules in an equitable and
efficient manner in every action. Id. This Honorable Court has an
affirmative duty "to exercise the authority conferred by these rules to
ensure that civil litigation is resolved not only fairly, but also without
undue cost or delay." Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 advisory committee's note (1993).
Rule 50(b) states that when "the court does not grant a motion for judgment
as a matter of law made at the close of all the evidence" the movant can
later renew its request. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). A liberal reading of this
language indicates a motion for JMOL does not have to be made precisely
at the very moment of the close of all the evidence, in exclusion of any
other possible time, in order to be renewed later. Instead, a liberal reading
suggests that if a motion for JMOL is made within a reasonable time of the
close of the evidence, it can be renewed, because a reasonable time
requirement would fulfill the purposes of equity and fairness required by
Rule 1. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
Because a precise time requirement would disallow renewing a
motion in a myriad of circumstances in which deviation from Rule 50(b)
was insignificant, it would not fulfill those purposes.
Therefore, a
reasonable time requirement evaluated in light of the facts of a specific
case best satisfies the purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of
securing a just resolution in each case. In the instant case, the Petitioners'
deviation from the rule was insignificant because they made a motion for
JMOL at the close of the Respondent's case, then briefly interviewed a
single witness before closing their case. (R. 1-20-21). Little time passed
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between the two and little additional evidence was presented. (R. 1-20-21).
Evaluating this case on these facts exemplifies that the purpose of Rule
50(b) is best met through its liberal interpretation. The Petitioners should
have been permitted to renew their motion for JMOL instead of being
punished for what could have been considered, at most, a minor divergence
from Rule 50(b), which is a mere technicality.
A relaxation of the Rule 50(b) language is evidenced by removal of
the word "all" between the 1963 and 1991 advisory committee notes. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 50 advisory committee's note (1963); Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 advisory
committee's note (1991). In 1963, the committee described a Rule 50(b)
motion as a renewal of an earlier motion "made at the close of all the
evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 advisory committee's note (1963). Yet in
1991, a Rule 50(b) motion was described as a renewal of an earlier motion
"made at the close of the evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 advisory committee
note (1991). By extracting the word "all" from the notes, the advisory
committee loosened the timing requirement and indicated their support of a
Therefore, the timing
more liberal interpretation of Rule 50(b).
requirement in Rule 50(b) should be read broadly in general and as applied
to the instant case. As a result, because the Petitioners' made their motion
for JMOL near the close of the evidence, they should have been allowed to
renew it.
Because liberal construction satisfies recognized safeguards that
ensure its appropriate use, it should be applied in the instant case over
adherence to the plain language of Rule 50(b). See Morell E. Mullins, Sr.,
Coming to Terms with Strict and Liberal Construction, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 9,
80 (2000). These three safeguards are: identifying doubt regarding
application of the rule in the instant case, finding the rule to be a valid
subject for liberal construction, and identifying purposes and policies that
justify construction in favor of a particular result. Id.
The first safeguard is satisfied when a judge "admit[s] to having some
degree of doubt about the proper application and 'meaning' of the rule.
Id. at 82. In the instant case, the judge expressed recognition of "valid
concerns" about whether to permit the renewed motion, requested briefs on
the issue, and held a hearing. (R. 1-23, 1-30). These facts indicate the
judge's doubt and satisfy the first safeguard. When the concept of liberal
construction can be shown to apply to the particular rule, such as through
"an express statutory directive mandating strict or liberal construction," the
second safeguard is met. Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Coming to Terms with
Strict and Liberal Construction, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 9, 83 (2000). Rule l's
directive that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be administered justly
and efficiently fulfills the second safeguard. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. The third
safeguard is satisfied by weighing relevant statutory purposes and policies
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that would then justify use of liberal or strict construction to reach the final
result. Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Coming to Terms with Strict and Liberal
Construction, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 9, 83 (2000). When weighed, the purposes
of governing civil procedure, equitably administering justice, alerting the
opposing party to the insufficiency of their case before it is submitted to the
jury, and reaching a verdict that has legal support, are best accomplished by
application of liberal construction to Rule 50(b). Individually, each of
these purposes can be achieved without strict adherence to the rule. When
considered together, they are best achieved through liberal construction
because a trial court judge can use his or her opportunity to observe the
proceedings to equitably administer justice in light of the facts of each case.
Therefore, the district court should not have adhered to the plain language
of Rule 50(b). The district court should have applied liberal construction
and permitted the Petitioners to renew their motion for JMOL.
2. Liberal construction is required by the majority of circuits to
achieve Rule 50(b)'s primary purpose.
Although there is an apparent conflict between the language of Rule
50 and its underlying purpose, the majority of circuits have applied the rule
according to its purpose. Rollin A. Ransom, Embracing Fairness Over
Formalism, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1060, 1097 (1993). The Second, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits support a liberal interpretation of
Rule 50(b) to serve the primary purpose of justice. See Laborers' Pension
Fund, 301 F.3d at 777; Taylor Publ'g Co., 216 F.3d at 472-73; Pahuta, 170
F.3d at 129; Singer v. Dungan, 45 F.3d 823, 829 (4th Cir. 1995); Riverview
Invs., Inc., 899 F.2d at 477; Armstrong v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 796
F.2d 366, 370 (10th Cir. 1986). Strict construction of Rule 50(b) would
result in an inflexible trial scenario contrary to its spirit. Riverview Invs.,
899 F.2d at 477. To avoid a miscarriage of justice resulting from a jury
verdict without legal support, adherence to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure must be properly balanced with liberal construction. Pahuta,
170 F.3d at 129; Karns v. Emerson Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 1452, 1456 (10th
Cir. 1987). Therefore, liberal construction should be applied to Rule 50(b)
to serve the underlying purpose of the rule and realize justice.
The Second Circuit has overlooked failure to comply with Rule 50(b)
to prevent manifest injustice in cases where a jury's verdict has lacked
legal support. Pahuta, 170 F.3d at 129; accord Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148
F.3d 149, 164 (2d Cir. 1998); Varda, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 45 F.3d
634, 638 (2d Cir. 1995). The Fourth Circuit has liberally construed Rule
50(b) when the spirit behind the rule has been served, and has held that to
avoid plain error appellate review is permissible even when there was a
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complete failure to move for a JMOL. Sinr, 45 F.3d at 828-829; accord
Fed. Say. and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Reeves, 816 F.2d 130, 137-38 (4th Cir.
1987).
The Fifth Circuit has excused technical noncompliance with Rule
50(b) when the purpose of the rule has been satisfied. Giles v. Gen. Elec.
Co., 245 F.3d 474, 482 (5th Cir. 2001); accord Greenwood v. Societe
Francaise De, 111 F.3d 1239, 1244 (5th Cir. 1997). The Sixth Circuit
adopted the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that slavish application to Rule 50(b)
would be "to succumb to a nominalism and a rigid trial scenario as equally
at variance as ambush with the spirit of our rules." Boynton v. TRW, Inc.,
858 F.2d 1178, 1186 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting Bohrer v. Hanes Corp., 715
F.2d 213, 216 (5th Cir. 1983)). The Tenth Circuit has recognized a balance
between strict adherence to Rule 50(b) and liberal construction. Karns, 817
F.2d at 1456.
Despite the Respondent's statement in Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants' Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of
Law that the Seventh Circuit recognized only one minor exception to the
right to a renewed motion, two recent cases indicate otherwise. (R. 1-28).
In Szmaj, the court stated that in some circumstances not excusing a failure
to renew would "ordain redundancy and create a trap for the unwary, of
which the law contains a sufficient number as is to keep us entertained."
Szmaj v. Am. Tel. & Telegraph Co., 291 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2002).
Later that same year, the court evaluated a case in which a motion for
JMOL was made prior to the close of the evidence based upon whether the
purpose of the requirement had been served. Laborers' Pension Fund, 301
F.3d at 777. The court stated that in every case it had evaluated
compliance with Rule 50, it had done so in relation to its rationale. Id.
As the majority of circuits have found, justice would best be served, in
the instant case, by liberal application of Rule 50(b). Because the
Petitioners made a motion for JMOL shortly before the close of evidence,
the purpose of Rule 50(b) was satisfied. Requiring strict adherence to the
rule would merely create a trap for the Petitioners, denying them justice
due to a technical error. Therefore, the trial court should have permitted
the Petitioners to renew their motion for JMOL.
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO PERMIT
THE PETITIONER TO RENEW THE MOTION AFTER THE JURY
VERDICT, BECAUSE THE COURT'S INDICATION THAT THE
MOTION NEED NOT BE RENEWED AT THE CLOSE OF EVIDENCE
SATISFIES THE TWO TESTS UTILIZED BY THE MAJORITY OF
CIRCUITS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE RIGHT IS RESERVED.
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The district court erred by refusing to permit the Petitioners to renew
the motion for JMOL after the jury verdict. The majority of circuits have
utilized two-prong tests to determine whether the right to renew a motion is
reserved. Rollin A. Ransom, Embracing Fairness Over Formalism, 91
Mich. L. Rev. 1060, 1073-82 (1993). They are split between applying two
distinct tests that share the same first prong, which asks whether the court
indicated the renewal of the motion was unnecessary. Riverview Invs., 899
F.2d at 477; Pahuta, 170 F.3d at 129. The second prong to the test used by
the First, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits asks whether the evidence introduced
after the initial motion was brief. Riverview Invs., Inc., 899 F.2d at 477.
The second prong to the test used by the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh
Circuits evaluates whether the party opposing the motion reasonably
understood, despite the denial of the initial motion, that the court's
indication meant that the motion was still alive and that the opposing party
was free to put on additional evidence. Pahuta, 170 F.3d at 129. The
district court erred by failing to evaluate the facts of the instant case under
one of these tests. The Petitioners would prevail under either test because
all three prongs are satisfied by the facts of this case. Therefore, the court
erred by refusing to permit the Petitioners to renew their motion for JMOL
because they reserved the right to renew the motion after the jury verdict.
1. The district court indicated the Petitioners' prior motion for
judgment as a matter of law need not be renewed.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbus erred by
failing to consider whether it indicated the Petitioners' prior motion for
JMOL need not be renewed. This factor is the first prong of both twoprong tests utilized by the majority of circuits in the evaluation of whether
the right to renew a motion after a jury verdict is reserved. Riverview
Invs., Inc., 899 F.2d at 477; Pahuta, 170 F.3d at 129.
Because the statements made by the judge in the instant case parallel
those found to be indicative that a motion for JMOL need not be renewed
in a number of cases, the statements indicated the Petitioners' prior motion
need not be renewed. After denying a motion, a district court's words
"we'll see how we do on that" indicated a prior motion need not be
renewed. Giles v. Gen. Elec. Co., 245 F.3d 474, 482 (5th Cir. 2001). The
appellate court reasoned these words indicated a willingness to revisit the
issue at the close of all the evidence. Id. The appellate court held that the
district court's words indicated the motion for JMOL need not be renewed.
Id.
In the instant case, the district court stated "I am going to deny this
motion for now" and "[w]e may want to re-visit this motion after you rest
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your case." (R. 1-20). These statements parallel those made in Giles. In
both cases, the judges denied the motions. Afterwards, the courts made
statements that indicated the motions were still alive and need not be
renewed. The statements "we'll see how we do" and "we may want to revisit this" both indicate the motions were still alive and therefore did not
need to be renewed. In both cases, the courts indicated the motions need
not be renewed. Therefore, the facts of the Petitioners' case satisfy the first
prong of the tests.
A district court's statements "I think there's enough to go to the jury.
The motion for judgment as a matter of law will be denied," and "there's
enough evidence to go," but damages would be difficult to prove, indicate
renewal is not necessary. Singer, 45 F.3d at 828. The appellate court
reasoned that the trial court indicated another motion was not necessary to
preserve the motion. Id. at 829. The appellate court held that the spirit
behind Rule 50 was served and post-verdict renewal of the motion was
valid. Id.
The judge's comments in Singer also parallel the comments made in
this case. The judges first denied the motions in both cases. Then the
judges made comments that damages would be difficult to prove and "we
may want to re-visit this." These comments demonstrated each judge's
belief that the motions were still alive. So, in both cases the judges
indicated that the motions did not need to be renewed. Consequently, the
first prong is satisfied in the Petitioners' case.
2. The evidence introduced after the initial motion was brief.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbus erred, by
failing to consider whether the evidence introduced after the initial motion
was brief. This factor is the second prong to the test used by the First,
Sixth, and Tenth Circuits in the evaluation of whether the right to renew a
motion after a jury verdict is reserved. See Beaumont v. Morgan, 427 F.2d
667, 670 (1st Cir. 1970); Riverview Invs., Inc., 899 F.2d at 477; Karns, 817
F.2d at 1456.
Because the Petitioners called only a single witness after their initial
motion for JMOL, the evidence that was introduced after the motion was
brief. When only one witness is called to testify after a motion, the
evidence introduced is brief. Riverview Invs., 899 F.2d at 478. In this
case, after a motion for JMOL was made, one additional witness testified
on a variety of issues. Id. The court reasoned that the testimony of one
witness was brief and the issues testified to were minor. Id. The court held
that the evidence introduced after the motion was brief and inconsequential.
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In the present case, the Petitioners made a motion for JMOL at the
close of the Respondent's case. (R. 1-20-21). The Petitioners then called a
single witness. (R. 1-20-21). Her testimony related to Washington High
School's peer tutoring program, which the Respondent had previously
discussed during her testimony. (R. 1-17-18). These facts are similar to
the facts in Riverview because in both cases, after the motion was made,
only one additional witness gave testimony.
Further, the witness'
testimony in each case was inconsequential. In Riverview, the witness
testified to issues the court determined were minor. Here, the witness
testified to issues that were already discussed within the trial and therefore
were minor as well. In both cases only one witness was called and the
testimony that witness gave was minor. Therefore, the evidence introduced
in this case was brief and inconsequential and the second prong of the first
test is satisfied.
3. The opposing party reasonably understood, despite the denial of
the initial motion, that the court's indication meant that the motion was still
alive and that the opposing party was free to put on additional evidence.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbus erred by
failing to consider whether the Respondent reasonably understood that the
court's indication meant that the motion was still alive and that the
Respondent was free to put on additional evidence. This factor is the
second prong to the test used by the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh
Circuits in the evaluation of whether the right to renew a motion after a
jury verdict is reserved. See Pahuta, 170 F.3d at 129; Sine, 45 F.3d at
829; Giles, 245 F.3d at 482.
Because that judge's words indicated the motion was still alive, the
Respondent should have reasonably understood, although the motion was
denied, she was free to put on additional evidence. A district court's denial
of a motion, followed by its indication that it had taken the matter under
advisement, enabled the opposing party to reasonably understand it was
free to put on additional evidence. Polanco v. City of Austin, Tex., 78 F.3d
968, 975 (5th Cir. 1996). In Polanco, the motion was made at the close of
the plaintiff's case. The defendant then put thirteen witnesses on to testify
over one and a half days. Id. The court reasoned a renewed motion would
have served no purpose because the original motion alerted the court and
opposing party of the challenge. Id. The court held failure to renew the
motion was not detrimental because it was "essentially in the same posture
at the close of the case as it was when the district court took it under
advisement." Id.
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In the instant case, the judge said "I am going to deny this motion for
now" and "[w]e may want to re-visit this motion after you rest your case."
(R. 1-20). These remarks are similar to those made by the judge in
Polanco, where the judge denied the motion but indicated the matter had
been taken under advisement. In both cases, the judges first denied the
motions but then went on to indicate they would still consider them.
Therefore, a renewed motion would have served no purpose because the
original motion alerted the court and opposing party of the challenge and
the second prong of the second test is satisfied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners respectfully request that this
Honorable Court reverse the judgment of the United States District Court
for the District of Columbus, by finding that requiring exhaustion is within
the spirit of what Congress meant to accomplish by creating the IDEA, and
that the Petitioners should have been permitted to renew their motion for
judgment as a matter of law.
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